VF-32 Gypsy 202 MiG Killer

As tensions between the USA and Libya continued to rise, the US 6th Fleet’s CVBG around USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) departed Cannes in France on 1 January 1989, setting a course for the central Mediterranean. Sailing in the direction of the port of Haifa in Israel, not in any relation to the dispute over Libyan CW projects, the aircraft of CVW-3 embarked on board the Kennedy ran a series of routine exercises in the airspace between the Greek island of Crete and the northern Libyan coast.

On 4 January, a group of A-6Es from VA-75 was exercising south of Crete, about 130km north of Libya, escorted by two pairs of F-14As from VF-32 and an E-2C from VAW-126, in what the USN calls ‘non-provocative, day cyclic operations. The southernmost CAP station was occupied by Tomcats flown by Commander Joseph B. Connelly, with Commander Leo F. Enwright in the back seat (flying the F-14A modex AC207, BuAerNo 159610), and Lieutenant Hermon C. Cook III, with Lieutenant Commander Steven Patrick Collins (flying the F-14A modex AC202, BuAerNo 159437). Due to heightened tensions with Libya, both crews were specially briefed for this mission and took off somewhat in a rush, their aircraft armed with four AIM-7 Sparrows and two AIM-9 Sidewinders.

At 1150, the E-2C informed the Tomcat crews about the launch of two MiG-23MFs of No. 1050 Squadron, LAAF, from al-Bumbah AB, northwest of Tobruk. The F-14s turned in a south-easterly direction and acquired the Libyans with their AWG-9 radars as they were 115km (72 miles) away, immediately recognizing them as a pair. The MiGs initially moved north-east, then east. After tracking them with their radars for a few seconds, both Tomcats turned south-west – away from the Libyans but the latter then reacted with a sharp, 90-degree turn in a northerly direction, thus initiating an engagement. Unknown to the LAAF, the USN had introduced an entirely new set of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for such situations off the coast of Libya. Based on their experiences from March 1986 and the fact that the LAAF had meanwhile been equipped with such interceptor types as MiG-23MFs, MiG-23MLs, and MiG-25P/PDSs, equipped with medium-range air-to-air missiles, the Americans granted permission for their pilots to consider themselves threatened by Libyans even if these did not open fire, but were approaching in a ‘threatening fashion’. Between April 1986 and January 1989, nothing of this kind happened: the Libyans meanwhile introduced the practice of turning away from USN F-14s as soon as these would ‘paint’ them with their radars. This time, it was different.

After the two Libyan MiG-23MFs turned north, they accelerated from 796 to 833km/h (430 to 450 knots) and climbed to 2,743m (9,000ft)), before turning north-west on a new collision course with the two F-14s. Trying to determine what was going to happen next, the Tomcats turned back south and then south-east, but the Libyans followed each time. As the two formations approached to 56km (35 miles) apart – with the Tomcats meanwhile heading almost directly south and the Libyans directly north, approaching at a combined speed of over 1,852km/h (1,000 knots) – the E-2C called the F-14-crews to advise them that Libyan intentions were probably hostile and they were free to open fire in self-defense even before the MiGs did so. Estimating that the Libyans were armed with Soviet-made R-23 or R-24 medium-range air-to-air missiles with an effective range of about 19 kilometers (12 miles), the two Swordsmen crews decided to arm their missiles at a range of about 32 kilometers (20 miles). They also began to gradually descend to make themselves more difficult targets for the less sophisticated radars of LAAF MiG-23s.

After trying to turn away from the Libyans for a fifth time, and with the range down to 19km, the two Tomcat crews decided to engage. Enright fired one AIM-7 at the lead MiG, followed by another a few seconds later launched from a range of 16km (10 miles). Both Sparrows appeared to guide at first and streaked towards their target, but as the LAAF pair turned slightly left – in a north-westerly direction – both lost the lock-on and missed.

The two F-14s then split, Connelly breaking hard right and Cook hard left, forcing the Libyans to concentrate on one of them: both MiGs turned into Cook, prompting him to reverse his turn and bank left towards his opponents, now about 9.6km (6 miles) away. Not waiting any longer, Cook fired his first Sparrow, head-on, and the missile raced straight for its target, impacting one of the MiG’s intakes causing it to explode in a huge fireball.

As the AC202 turned right to avoid debris from the downed MiG-23, Connelly approached the Libyan wingman from behind. Trying to target it with a Sidewinder, he could not get a good tone alert: after a few frantic seconds, Connelly sorted out the problem with his switches, got a very strong tone, and pulled the trigger. The Sidewinder hit the top side of the MiG, causing the pilot to eject.112 As they both descended to the safety of a low altitude, both Tomcat crews saw the parachutes of the Libyan pilots and then accelerated north, without waiting for two additional Libyan MiG-23s that had meanwhile been scrambled from al-Bumbah AB.